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Sections of this paper which summarize the actual workings
of the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) are based, in part,
upon unpublished papers produced by individuals working at the
RAND Corporation in the RAND Strategy Assessment Center. The
authors are grateful to Michael Rich, Vice President for National
Security Research, Dr. Paul K. Davis, the Principal Investigator
for "Improved Methods for Strategic Analysis," Dr. Bruce W.
Bennett, Dr. William L. Schwabe, COL Robert D. Howe USA (Ret.),
CAPT James Amerault, USN (currently assigned to the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, 0P-91DB), et al, at the RAND Corpora-
tion for their support during installation of the RSAS at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The authors are also apprecia-
tive of support and assistance provided by Andrew Marshall,
Director Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD/NA) and COL K. Scott Fisher, USAF, the contract
technical monitor for much needed installation and maintenance
support; CDR George Kraus, USN, at the Navy Operational
Intelligence Center and LCDR Norm Green, USN, formerly at NPS for
their assistance in reviewing naval models; CDR Joseph Stewart,
USN, Director, Wargaming Analysis and Research Lab at NPS for
hardware and technical support; Distinguished Professor John
Dyer, Professor Emeritus Sherman Blandin, and LTC Richard
Forney, USAF, NPS, for their assistance in obtaining necessary
hardware and advice; the NPS Research Council, who provided a
grant to sponsor the RSAS installation; and to CAPT Philip Boyer,
USN, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603), who
agreed to sponsor work in fiscal year 1988. Draft copies of this
report were circulated to interested offices, agencies, commands,
and schools in December 1987. The authors appreciate the com-
ments received from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OP-603), the Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel (0P-
00K), the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College, the
USCINCPAC Scientific & Technical Advisor, the Director of the
Army's Concepts Analysis Agency, and others.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes the RAND Strategy Assessment System
(RSAS) installation at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The
NPS RSAS became operational in September 1987. The RSAS is a
product of a multiyear effort by the RAND Corporation ("Improved
Methods for Strategic Analysis") under the sponsorship of the
Director, Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD/NA) . It attempts to combine the best features of
political-military wargaming and analytic modeling. The RSAS is
extremely flexible: it can be run in a near automatic mode with
essentially two expert systems playing against each other, or it
can be run as an interactive game where all the moves are con-
trolled by human players. In between these extremes, the RSAS can
be used as an analytic tool to support strategy research and
instruction.
Major models in the RSAS include Blue/Red/Green agents play-
ing the various nations, the Force Agent for actual military
operations, and the Control Agent which allows the analyst to
control events, the scenario, timing, etc. National Command
Level models conduct high level decision-making, and analytic war
plans carry out military operations for each side. The RSAS can
currently be run emphasizing strategic nuclear combat, Central
European theater warfare, naval warfare to a certain degree, and
secondary land/other theater engagements. The current naval model
is considered evolutionary in that only basic naval play is
possible.
The current software installation at NPS is RSAS release
3.0, running on a Sun microworkstation with a large hard-disk in
support. Secure space and partial hardware/software support is
provided by the Operations Research Department. Operating
expertise is provided by the National Security Affairs Depart-
ment. Future enhancements to the system include additional
workstations locally networked for interactive wargaming and a
large screen display for instruction and game purposes. Primary
RSAS use at NPS will be in support of research sponsored by those
organizations that have funded the installation. It is antici-
pated also that extensive use will be made of the system in
support of student theses and classroom instruction.
RSAS models are not yet completely developed to the satis-
faction of Navy users. Rather than precluding future support of
the RSAS, the Navy should continue to encourage development of
maritime models and continued in-house expertise in the use of
the system. When fully operational, the RSAS will be a unigue
system that will aid Navy analysts and decision-makers who, for
the first time, will have models that can represent every level
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The RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) was developed by
the RAND Corporation under a project entitled "Improved Methods
for Strategic Analysis." The work is sponsored by the Director,
Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD/NA) in cooperation with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS), each of the Service Deputy Chiefs for Plans,
Policy, and Operations, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
National Security Agency (NSA) , and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) . Representatives of these organizations make up the RSAS
Steering Group.
Current users of the RSAS include OSD/NA, the Force Struc-
ture, Resource & Assessment Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-8),
the CIA Office of Soviet Affairs (SOVA), the Army Concept
Analysis Agency (CAA), the National Defense University War Gaming
and Simulation Center (NDU-WGSC) and the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS). The system will later be installed at: OSD Pro-
gram Analysis & Evaluation (OSD/PA&E), the NSA, the DIA, the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) , the Air University Center
for Aerospace Doctrine Research & Education/Wargaming & Technical
Analysis Division (AU/CADRE/WGTA) , and the U.S. Commander in
Chief Pacific (USPACOM) J-55. Additional users, such as the
Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, may be
authorized by the RSAS Steering Group at a later time.
Essentially a complex political-military simulation, the
RSAS will eventually have the capability to handle all forms and
phases of warfare, including intelligence and logistics, in a
highly aggregated fashion. This will include the ability to play
crises short of war, extended conventional war, nuclear war,
conventional actions after nuclear strikes, war in space, war at
sea, and all supporting political actions that supplement the
armed conflict portion of war. The models are intentionally
deterministic; hence plays may be repeated with the analyst
making the choice of variables to be modified in order to do
sensitivity analysis. All decisions are automatically logged,
making transparency a major asset.
NPS was selected to be the recipient of the Navy's first
RSAS as a result of a meeting of the RSAS Steering Group in Santa
Monica, California on 24-25 March 1986. This decision was
recorded in a memorandum from the Director of Net Assessment/OSD,
dated 12 May 1986, reporting the results of the conference.
Hardware was obtained by NPS using $43,227 in 1987 NPS labora-
tory package resources to upgrade a Sun workstation originally
purchased by the Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) for the NPS
Wargaming Analysis & Research Laboratory (WARLAB) . The RSAS soft-
ware, valued at some $31M, was provided by the Rand Corporation
as authorized by the RSAS Steering Group. Other support for
research has been provided for by a $16,194 grant in FY-87 by the
NPS Foundation Research Council and by $135,000 in FY-88 Navy
Direct Research Funding. The NPS RSAS became operational in
September 1987.
This report satisfies the requirements of the NPS Foundation
Research Council grant and will provide a brief overview of what
the RSAS is, the types of capabilities found in strategic
nuclear, European and other land theaters, and naval models, how
the RSAS is set up at NPS , and opportunities for research. It is
also produced as a product for the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OP-603) as a deliverable resulting from FY-88 Navy
Direct Research Funding. Appendices will include a more detailed
description of the hardware and software, the standard operating
procedures for RSAS employment at NPS, specific restrictions due
to security of the models, and agreements with appropriate
departments regarding maintenance and security.
Part II
THE RSAS CONCEPT
1. Methodology . The RSAS is the product of a multiyear effort
which is attempting to improve the ability of strategy analysts
by combining the best features of political-military wargaming
and analytic modeling. This approach presents certain difficul-
ties since war games usually address the asymmetries in conflict,
the roles of non-superpowers, the nuclear forces, and the opera-
tional constraints, etc. Modeling, in contrast, tends to be more
rigorous, and more inclined to a "what if?" type of approach.
There are two important components in the RSAS approach: The use
of decision models, and the procedures for analytic modeling.
The use of decision models to replace some or even all of
the human decision making involved in game play both speeds play
and requires a rigorous approach to the decisions being made. It
also insures that the same decisions are always made for a given
set of circumstances. Analysts and game players can still play
all or part of the time, depending upon the requirements of the
situation, by changing variables.
The second important component, the procedures for modeling
the actual warfare, is embodied in the system of models called
CAMPAIGN. CAMPAIGN is essentially the force agent for the RSAS,
evaluating force operations and adjudicating combat. It uses a
relatively high level of aggregation for forces, geography, and
targets, reflects increasingly higher asymmetries in terminology
and operational concepts between Red and Blue, and captures
parametrically some of the more complex military operations, such
as mobile missiles and communications sabotage. CAMPAIGN allows
the user to set most major parameters into the simulation, such
as the yield of a nuclear weapon, or to script the results of
"off-line" analysis, such as the impact of chemical attacks on
aircraft sortie rates.
In addition to permitting rapid testing of various scenarios
and alternatives, the fast RSAS run time permits a "lookahead" in
which the player or analyst can run a game within a game to test
a plan using the entire gaming system to play against perceptions
of the opponent, ^he "lookahead" tests the feasibility and
acceptability of a specific plan, although the results may differ
from subsequent runs due to misperceptions about the opponent or
that the opponent simply chooses another alternative.
2 . Models in the RSAS . Since there was never any intent to make
the RSAS available to the general public, model architecture
itself is generally classified. Although the RSAS Steering Group
approved the creation of totally unclassified models, with the
ability to add classified data, the resources for such a massive
undertaking have not followed, and it is not expected that an
UNCLASSIFIED RSAS will ever be developed. The major political
agents in the RSAS are the Blue, Red, and Green representing
NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and other countries, res-
pectively. The Force Agent (CAMPAIGN), tracks military forces
worldwide and assesses the results of force operations and
battles. The third major agent is the Control Agent which assists
the analyst in writing information displays, changing parameters,
introducing exogenous events, and specifying the key events of a
10
desired scenario. Each of these major agents and models is
covered in detail below.
Red and Blue Agents . RSAS command, control and communication
3
(C ) models have been developed that represent the actual organi-
3
zation and operation of NATO/U.S. and WTO/USSR C functions.
2
Command and Control (C ) of forces is generally displayed in
normal wartime position, i.e., there are generally no separate
2
peacetime and wartime C organizations. The functions of chang-
2 2
ing operational control from peacetime C to wartime C , however,
are generally accounted for within the RSAS. Thus, U.S. nava]
2
forces may be under the C of NATO's Supreme Commander-Atlantic
(SACLANT) for display purposes, but additional tableaus may show
2
these forces as not available. Although such C depiction is not
absolutely correct, the emphasis on wartime functions for the
RSAS did not warrant the additional expense and computer memory
2
needed to depict correctly C in both peacetime and war.
Generally, the names used for NATO/U.S. Commanders-in-Chief
(CINC's) correspond to reality although a general command for
forces in the continental U.S. was used instead of the multiple
commands that actually exist. Actual CINC boundaries were also
used.
For WTO/USSR theaters of military operations (TVD) commands,
actual names /boundaries are used, recognizing that in wartime
these strategic directions will not necessarily follow pre-war
expectations. Communications models used are classified and as
accurate as possible, given the level of classification of the
system. The RSAS architecture allows more accurate portrayal of
3
C
, to include data at extremely high levels of classification.
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The Red and Blue agents for the RSAS each have a high level
model termed the National Command Level (NCL) that emulates the
highest authority for each agent - the National Command Authority
(NCA) for Blue, and the Defense Council for Red. The NCL selects
escalation guidance, objectives, and strategies for each theater
based upon the type of NCL selected by the analyst and a series
of rules assessing the various NCL parameters to include the
threat, the type and rapidity of decisionmaking, the status of
superpower relations, etc. There are currently two different Red
and two different Blue agents available in the RSAS; one set
being more "hawkish" than the other.
A Global Command Authority (GCL) that represents the U.S./
NATO Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO Military Committee, and
Soviet General Staff (VGK) then implements these decisions into
specific plans to be run. The NCL models selected by the analyst
can be modified or can be run on an automated basis. They can be
used to run the game or can be studied as part of the research
into national decision-making procedures.
Green Agent . The Green Agent is the RSAS model of non-
superpower states which simulates national behavior in periods of
superpower crises and open warfare. Countries modeled include the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, all NATO countries other than the
U.S., as well as Japan, China, and numerous others. Green Agent
is a rule based model which tests various conditions and takes
actions based upon the rules of the system. Variables for each
country include such items as alliance, orientation, temperament,
assertiveness, opportunism, staying power, and nuclear capabi-
lity. These variables can be set at the start of the game or
12
changed during the game run.
Control Agent . The Control Agent allows the analyst to
schedule the writing out of information displays, to change
selected parameters, to introduce exogenous events such as
unconventional warfare, and to specify key events in the
scenario, as required. The analyst can specify, for example, the
day when nuclear warfare is to start, the loss of command posts
to special forces action at specified times, and the degree of
logging detail desired. The Control agent is extremely useful in
adapting game play to the analytic or research requirements at
hand. The Control Agent uses a System Monitor polling the deci-
sion models and a series of wakeup rules that are created when
the analyst selects the various inputs noted above.
CAMPAIGN . CAMPAIGN is the global combat model providing a
fully integrated treatment of conventional, theater-nuclear, and
intercontinental nuclear warfare on a worldwide scale. CAMPAIGN
is, in turn, part of the larger system that provides national
level political models that deal with such issues as grand
strategy, escalation, and war termination. CAMPAIGN is a time
stepped model in which the length of the steps (one hour or less,
up to 24 hours) are determined by the world situation, and by
various wake up rules set by the players or by the system deci-
sion models. Most of CAMPAIGN is run in a "C" language program
called "Camper". The remainder is coded in RAND-ABEL, and
includes the S/LAND referee as well as the tactical warning
decision tables part of the strategic C3I. The heart of CAMPAIGN
is a collection of theater warfare, naval warfare, strategic
warfare, and supporting models. These warfare models, usually
13
developed separately to control complexity, contain significant
interactions, sometimes using the same submodel for multiple
purposes, e.g., dispersal of aircraft. Also, some model substitu-
tion can take place, e.g., RAND's TacSage for the normal air
battle model. It is anticipated that CAMPAIGN will be used for
Central Europe and Korea, while the S/LAND models will be used
for northern and southern Europe, the Middle East, Southwest
Asia, and Cuba.
3. Analytic War Plans . Blue analytic war plans (AWP's) are based
upon the same base year as the data bases. War plans do not
derive from strategies used to support programming but rather
from strategies based upon forces in hand. Historical files were
used to create AWP's for earlier years. AWP architecture should
support entering a wide variety of future or alternative current
plans, and the architecture is generally compatible with that in
current use by major CINC's. Red AWP's were developed using the
best information available from national intelligence sources.
Where alternative strategies are possible, a default strategy is
provided. Should an analyst desire -co modify AWP's to reflect
alternative strategies, this is possible.
The AWP's in the RSAS are written in RAND-ABEL code, are
relatively easy to read, and can be modified, although implemen-
tation of such modifications is not trivial. The AWP's are cons-
tructed in a modular fashion, using a phase, move, and order
structure, together with bounds and wakeup rules for the various
commands. AWP's can be controlled by the use of the Data Editor
tableaux for the AWP's, although care must be taken with regard
14
to changing the variables.
4. Data Base and Software Tools . Data base type information is
contained in the notional World Situation Data Set (WSDS), con-
taining entries in both RAND-ABEL and in the "C" programming
language. All of the decision models and a few Force models are
written in RAND-ABEL for understandability and ease of modifica-
tion. The analyst can interface with the system through the data
editor, force displays, map tool, the logs of the various agents'
actions, and the graphics Tool. These interfaces can be used to
set and change inputs before and during the game, can be used to
call and analyze data at any point during or after the game, and
can be used to study in detail the logic and responses of the
various models following each game.
Four of the software tools merit special mention:
a. Data Editor: the primary means of viewing and changing
data interactively. It relies upon displays called tableaux which
are arranged in sets according to function.
b. Cross Referencing Tool: for using or building rule based
decision models. It can provide allowed values for variables,
their locations, and comments regarding them.
c. Hierarchy Tool: depicts which entity is active at any
given time during the game, permits the game to be stopped when a
particular entity is active, and can permit rules to be displayed
regarding a selected actor.
d. Retargeting Tool: interactive spreadsheet program that
allows modifying strategic targeting.
Other interface features of RSAS 3.0 include Interpretive
15
RAND-ABEL which permits fast rule changes in the source code, and
the numerous "help" windows and README files throughout the
system.
The standard configuration for RSAS 3.0 is the Sun 3/160
color workstation operating under Berkeley UNIX, and using the
"C" programming language. RSAS 3.0 has some 300,000 lines of
source code, or about 600,000 equivalent lines of "C" code. Rand
originally intended that the RSAS would have a standard configu-
ration based upon a VAX 11-780, but opted in favor of the Sun
'.* irkstation with its superior human interface. The feasibility of
other workstation options, including those using VMS, has been
approved by the RSAS Steering group and may be examined at some
future time when a sponsor is willing to fund the development.
16
Part III
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND RELATED MODELS
1. Strategic vs Theater . CAMPAIGN provides extensive "strategic"
nuclear models of targeting, command, control, communications,
3
and intelligence (C I), force operations, and battle damage
assessment (BDA) . These models are integrated into the overall
CAMPAIGN structure, thus, "strategic" nuclear forces may be used
in the theater campaign and may be damaged by the theater nuclear
or conventional campaign. "Strategic" and-, theater nuclear models
share the same BDA models. For ease in communicating to Western
readers, the more familiar use of the term "strategic" will be
used in this report; i.e., intercontinental nuclear forces that
are generally addressed in "strategic" arms control agreements.
The reader is cautioned that this concept of "strategic" is not
shared by the Soviet Union nor the Red agent in the RSAS.
2. Nuclear Forces . Nuclear capable forces can be used for
strategic, operational, or tactical nuclear missions in any
theater of warfare. Within CAMPAIGN, Red, Blue, or Green
(British, French, or Chinese) strategic nuclear missions are
currently carried out by heavy bombers, land (ICBM) and
submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBM), and cruise missiles,
depending upon the types of forces assigned to that agent. All
strategic nuclear forces as well as operational and tactical
nuclear forces can be used . for theater nuclear missions.
Artillery fired atomic projectiles, tactical surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air missiles, atomic demolition mines, and
17
nuclear capable tactical aircraft are used for battlefield
nuclear missions. Tactical nuclear warfare at sea is an area that
will need extensive upgrading in the future to represent fully
the options available to each political-military agent.
Generally, nuclear forces are designed to execute preplanned
targeting packages to handle various warfighting options that
support the strategic, operational, or tactical objectives
specified by the appropriate functional/area commanders.
Execution of strategic forces operations is dependent upon the
appropriate National Command Level (NCL) connectivity, but
currently theater and battlefield models do not explicitly model
3
the necessary C .
3. Readiness . Levels of readiness are as indicated by the force
alert level, which is a fraction representing the combat ready
percentage of submarines, aircraft, and missiles in the data
base. A default alert rate is assumed but the analyst may vary
these levels uniformly or by force type. CAMPAIGN provides an
automatic bomber and tanker flush on warning model as an option
to increase survivability.
4. Operations . Strategic nuclear forces can be alerted,
dispersed, deployed, executed and damaged. These forces will
execute whenever they receive the appropriate authenticated com-
munications which are disseminated from the NCL to the functional
or regional groupings of forces. ICBM's and SLBM's are moved by a
common missile movement model. Missile trajectories and space
based defenses will be added in a future RSAS software release.
A parameterized ballistic missile defense model extracts fixed
18
attrition rates on incoming re-entry vehicles up to a selectable
threshold.
Bombers and cruise missiles are assigned to predefined
flight paths according to expected targeting plans, although the
analyst may vary predefined plans. Bombers are assigned tankers
as required and are subjected to the simplified air defense
model that allows for a fixed attrition rate for all enemy air-
craft by region. Bombers may release cruise missiles at the
appropriate distances from their target. Modeling of recovery and
reconstitution of bomber forces is currently extremely limited.
All nuclear forces are subject to attrition during the conven-
tional phase of a war. Provisions for land silo and naval missile
reloads will have to be added in future software deliveries.
3 3
5. C I_. The current nuclear C models deal primarily with the
ability of the NCL to communicate with strategic nuclear forces.
3
C decisions are made by the models of the full RSAS instead of
3
CAMPAIGN. Once a decision has been made, the C model assesses
the capability of the source command node to communicate with its
3
destinations. The output of the C model is an estimated time for
correct message receipt and the fraction of each force
connected. The model conducts a path search to find the fastest
available path to destination. The various alternative command
posts and communications aircraft are modeled in RSAS, consider-
ing refueling, maintenance, and home base damage. Warning is
partially modeled for strategic forces. Satellite detection of
missile launch is modeled as are certain communications paths.
Tactical warning in CAMPAIGN serves to alert the NCL, and causes
19
appropriate countermeasures to be taken. Strategic warning is
specifically addressed by various political and military signals
given by the Red, Blue, and Green agents.
6. Targeting and BDA. There are 124 distinct classes of targets
in CAMPAIGN, referring not only to types of fixed facilities but
also to more dynamic targets such as mobile missiles, aircraft,
or troop formations. Damage from nuclear and conventional weapons
is inflicted by attacking a target class and subclass within a
given region. CAMPAIGN uses a generalized BDA assessment methodo-
logy (modeling only blast damage) for all conventional and
3
nuclear weapons. C facilities may be damaged by electromagnetic
3
pulse and scripted (off-line) sabotage. Degradation in C due to
jamming, etc. , can also be represented. The attacker currently is
not allowed a real-time BDA capability.
20
Part IV
CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER MODEL
Theater warfare modeling is probably the best developed
aspect of the RSAS. The model has concentrated on the land/air
war on the central front, with global escalatory, naval, and
strategic nuclear force operations. Logistics that could impact
on the central front is to be improved later. The result is a
reasonably reliable model of the central front, but an incomplete
global model that needs to represent accurately these potentially
significant contributions. Without these full capabilities to
model areas outside of the European theater, the RSAS will be
incapable of performing the types of simulations that are envi-
saged by the Navy.
The model follows Red divisions and Blue brigades along axes
of advance/defense as specified in analytic war plans (AWP's)
using a roughly rectangular grid base superimposed upon the
geographic features of central Europe. The simulation/model
emphasizes the overall Red/Blue theater commander's perspective
rather than that of the division and corps commander. The model
tracks unit characteristics in some detail to include nationa-
lity, cohesiveness, composition, and level of training. The user
can vary assumptions about a fairly broad range of issues to
include national fighting effectiveness, maximum combat inten-
sity, exchange ratios from prepared defenses, the effectiveness
of close air support and helicopters in imposing attrition, and
the delay, defense and attacker strategies.
The model allows the attacker and defender to maneuver at
21
the corps level or higher. Axes for main thrusts, holding
actions, follow-on attacks, and flank protection are all
possible. There is also provision for the attacker to conduct a
strategic level envelopment/encirclement (Red's preferred offen-
sive) and for the defender to mount counteroffensives. The model
uses phases of battle to include preparation, assault, break-
through, exploitation and pursuit. Breakthroughs, large local
one-time losses, and operational maneuver groups in the
defender's rear area may all be represented. One of the major
strengths of the system is that Blue players are forced to con-
front a Red who engages not in parallel opposing "pistons" but
rather through an envelopment/encirclement method of advance.
The current model does not allow for amphibious landings,
combined arms amphibious/airborne assault, defense against inva-
sion, inshore mine warfare, or an accurate representation of the
battle for the sea lines of communication. These deficiencies
will need to be corrected before the RSAS can perform all the
simulations of Navy interest. When the RSAS is fully developed,
analysts will have a new opportunity to study the cross
influences of war at sea to warfare ashore.
With regard to the air war, the model conducts operations
for Blue squadrons and Red air regiments, handling sortie genera-
tion, mission planning, air-to-air combat, interdiction, and air-
ground interactions to include close air support and battlefield
interdiction. Air power can be used to defeat an operational
maneuver group during the period of initial insertion. Carrier-
based naval aviation can be used by the theater commander to
supplement land-based tactical air assets in all normal air
22
warfare missions.
Logistics is played at a high level of aggregation by
tracking days of supplies by nationality and permitting optional
sharing of supplies. Movement of supplies is simulated crudely,
with each geographic zone having its own lines of communication
traf ficability and vulnerability. Movement through the zone can
be reduced by interdiction. Strategic mobility deals with combat
forces and support packages separately. Sea lines of communica-
tion are not currently fully modeled, making the logistical
sustainability issue a major current failing.
23
Part V
NAVAL WARFARE AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
1. Naval Warfare . The naval combat model permits naval force
movements including sealift, elementary antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) operations, and attacks on land targets by carrier-based
aviation and cruise missiles. It does not permit battle group
defense, at-sea engagements, combined arms strikes against battle
groups, or full representation of battles over sea lines of
communication. Individual ship^-sre represented, but operations
are conducted and battle damage assessment (BDA) done at the task
group level. Naval operations are conducted in accordance with
rules of engagement (ROE's) prepared for Blue, Red, and Green.
Combat results vary by region. Choke point engagements are
handled separately.
ASW includes the employment of submarines, maritime patrol
aircraft, and surface ships with emphasis on operations against
nuclear powered submarines. Sea-based aviation, ASW mines, ASW
nuclear weapons, space assets, and operations by diesel sub-
marines all need to be added.
2. Location and Capability . There are 32 ocean regions, and 32
additional ocean subregions and chokepoints currently in the
RSAS. These regions and subregions/chokepoints represent the
lowest level of geographic detail for naval and maritime forces.
All ships are located in these ocean region/subregions unless
they are in port, in which case they are assigned to a land
region, thus allowing a distinction between attacks on maritime
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assets on the high seas and those in port or in internal waters.
Deployment orders specify unit location (latitude/longitude)
within an RSAS region.
Routes for naval forces consist of paths from ports to
operating regions. The RSAS chooses the most direct feasible
route unless specifically instructed to use intermediate regions.
Each ship is assigned to a class, with all ships in a class
having the same general characteristics. Data records are main-
tained for each ship, to include weapons capacity, ASW capabi-
lity, sustainability data, and special weapons inventories.
3. Organization . Individual ships are assigned to task groups
headed by a designated flagship. The task groups are subordinated
to task forces and fleet commanders. The task group is the basic
element for naval forces, and they are named to signify their
primary mission, e.g., carrier groups, anti-carrier warfare
groups, convoys, etc. Naval forces can be displayed in tabular
form by individual ship or task group, by listing all forces
assigned to an ocean region/chokepoint, or by listing forces
assigned to a specific mission activity. Nuclear powered bal-
listic missile submarines are treated as strategic missile
forces, and were described previously with the strategic models.
4. Deployment . Naval forces are organized and deployed in a mid-
1985 force structure with Blue and Red strategies for employment
paralleling those expected for the U.S. /NATO and the Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact. The initial deployment of Blue forces is
intended to be consistent with U.S. /NATO maritime strategy.
Initial Red employment emphasizes "bastion" defense. Green naval
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forces are deployed and operated in accordance with expected
behavior of each individual nation. The RSAS will eventually
allow the employment of forces in other possible modes, e.g.,
"swinging" forces from one major command to another, convoy
escort instead of forward operations, interdiction of the sea
lines of communication instead of "bastion" defense, etc.
5 . Naval Combat.
a. ASW . ASW operations in the RSAS are modeled by the inter-
action between submarines, surface task groups or maritime patrol
aircraft and submarines. Each ocean region, subregion and choke-
point is assessed regarding the presence of submarines and ASW
forces and, if combat is authorized, capabilities versus vulnera-
bilities are computed and damage calculated for each side on a
periodic basis. All ASW capable ships and aircraft are assigned
capabilities relative to a baseline unit with engagement para-
meters. Relative capabilities are pooled when multiple units are
present, and attrition is distributed based upon relative
vulnerabilities and current damage levels. Certain parameters can
be changed by the analyst using "script" commands. Results can
be displayed in several different ways: by region, by units, by
activity.
ASW activity can be initiated by analytic war plans or by
issuing force orders. Force orders can be used to deploy forces,
to increase activity, to change operating areas, to assign forces
to new task groups or forces, and to assign maritime patrol
aircraft to an ocean area. Combat is controlled by assigning
ROE's to each ocean region, subregion or chokepoint in the form
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of attack, defend, withdraw, trail, and exclude.
b. Air Strikes . Fighters and attack aircraft on board air-
craft carriers can be assigned to launch flights in support of
theater warfare. The carriers must be within range, and sorties
will continue on a daily basis until unassigned or the carrier
moves out of range. To perform strikes, laydown packages of
targets must be preplanned using the strike order. Nuclear
strikes can be ordered from appropriate naval forces, and an
inventory is maintained.
c. Surface Ship Engagements . Currently, the RSAS cannot
support combined arms warfare against carriers, except by writing
ad hoc rule based models in RAND-ABEL for specific problems.
Surface-to-surface combat is not yet modeled, but scripted or
directed ship kills can be used at any time.
6. Asymmetries . It is important to remember the very different
natures of the Blue and Red navies which present different
modeling problems. These asymmetries include the following
areas: different objectives and style of maritime warfare such as
the Red Navy's preference for sea denial and selective sea
control in the maritime approaches to the homeland as opposed to
the Blue Navy preference for forward deployment and long-range
power projection; survivability in nuclear powered ballistic
missile submarines in which Blue relies upon stealth while Red
relies upon defensive "bastions"; at-sea tactical nuclear weapons
capabilities; peacetime naval deployment patterns; forces and
concepts of employment for naval aviation; command and control;
the influence of the ground forces in the thinking and employ-
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ment of navies; the differing capabilities of the allied navies;
and the use of diesel submarine forces.
The RSAS has been developed with Blue/Red asymmetries in
mind. The top down approach and the use of separate Red and Blue
models lends itself to the development of the differing
approaches characteristic of the Red and Blue sides. The RSAS
also permits the use of special warfare phenomena that have been
difficult to model in other systems. The global scope of the RSAS
gives it a unigue capability to reflect the breadth of asymme-
tries, described briefly above, and the abilities of navies to
execute lateral excursions and escalation by fighting a more
extended campaign.
7. Improvements Needed . There are several areas in the RSAS where
the models are not sufficient to meet NPS and Navy reguirements.
All of these have been communicated to Rand and OSD/NA. Some of
the more obvious improvements needed include:
a. Strategic nuclear strikes against the shore from naval
ballistic and cruise missile carriers from all nations that
possess or might possess such a capability, and an ability to
reload launchers where appropriate.
b. Active defense of strategic nuclear assets at sea by a
combined arms defense by all nations that might employ such a
strategy or for all nations so that such a concept can be
analyzed.
c. The full range of all current and programmed maritime
nuclear capabilities.
d. Active attacks by all types of ASW forces, including at-
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sea ASW aviation against naval ballistic and cruise missile
carriers and attacks by the appropriate air defense forces
(including naval) against the missiles. ASW forces must also be
expanded to include space-based systems, communications intercept
capability, and passive listening devices.
e. Strikes against the shore by Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
assets for all nations, full defense of the CVBG against a com-
bined arms attack, recovery of assets by the CVBG, and reattacks
against the shore targets.
f. Convoy operations in all ocean areas, including attacks
against them from a combined arms force and full defense.
g. Improved models for strategic sealift and logistics flow
for all theaters of warfare.
h. Mine warfare, including modern ASW mines, in areas where
they are expected to occur and to have a major military or poli-
tical impact on the course of a campaign.
i. Amphibious warfare in areas where it is expected to occur
in major campaigns, and where analysts might wish to test its
impact; specifically against islands in the Baltic, Norwegian and
Barents Sea, along the flank areas of NATO, and the Pacific Far
East.
j . Although execution of expected maritime strategies as the
normal default is proper, options must include all other major
possible strategies: "swing," interdiction/defense of sea lines
of communication, etc.
k. Faithful representation of actual areas of responsibility
for U.S. /NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's)
boundaries. For the classroom, it is important that actual names
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and boundaries be used vice artificial creations designed to ease
modeling.
1. Major assumptions about vital strategic canals and water-
ways that are consistent with the assumptions made by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/CINC's for planning purposes.
m. Political actions depicting activation of naval control
of shipping world-wide and potential contributions of other
nations.
n. Consideration of possible actions to be taken against
Cuba in the o T'int of a major war in Europe.
o. Strategies for a war focused on and originating in the
Pacific. Global warfighting options simply must be addressed.
p. In-depth operations in the Mediterranean, Baltic, North
Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk,
Bering Sea, Arctic, etc., in support of the appropriate theater
commander's objectives for each area of responsibility. NPS
desires to use these theaters to assess competitive strategies
for war. In-depth bastion defense must be replicated.
q. Careful consideration of where the "sea" ends with regard
to the question of escalation and control of forces. Simply put,
naval forces that are attacked on the high seas will send a
political signal that is different than if those same forces are
attacked in territorial seas, historic/closed bays, internal
waters, etc.
r. Escalation considerations must also include the asymme-
tries in the political sensitivities of certain areas of the
world's oceans as expressed by different political actors, e.g.,
Red claims to ocean space and views on the right of access may
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not be the same as Blue or Green. A proper depiction of escala-
tion with regard to maritime operations must account for
operations taken in varying parts of the oceans; i.e., an attack
on maritime assets in Soviet Arctic "zonal" sectors is probably
more escalatory than an attack on that same asset in the mid-
Pacific Ocean.
s. Escalation must also represent the different values
assigned to different types of maritime assets. For example, an
attack on a civilian registered/owned ship may bring one type of
response but an attack on a man-of-war may bring another. A
fairly sophisticated accounting needs to be created listing ship
ownership, crew, and registry so that actions taken against such
assets involves the proper political actors.
t. Representation of drilling platforms and other such mari-
time assets needs to be added to allow for attacks against these.
Nations are expected to respond to attacks on these types of
assets.
u. Naval BDA currently spreads fractions of damage over the
entire battle group. A more detailed assessment may prove too
expensive and self-defeating for the overall purposes of the
RSAS. Scripted battle results, however, might specify details
not actually captured in the models to lend credibility, e.g., a
CVBG might have its combat potential reduced in the models as the
result of an attack but the displays might state CV radars out of
commission, flight deck damaged, etc. In any case, defensive
capability should degradate in stages, not just all at once when
a ship is sunk.
v. Although the RSAS is not a tactical tool, the current
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lack of geographic coordinates for naval force strike orders
undermines credibility.
w. ROE's must vary by oceanic/land region, e.g., the rules
allowing attacks on enemy naval forces should not be the same if
the unit is on the high seas or is in port, or, the rules may not
be the same in the Pacific if the war is thus far confined to the
Atlantic.
x. Surface-to-surface warfare is needed. Surface-to-air
warfare needs to treat fighters as something other than just
long-range surface to air missiles. Surface-to-air warfare needs
to account for multiple engagements of incoming aircraft or
missiles (layered defense). Short-range surface-to-air missile
capability may be too ambitious.
y. Cruise missile attacks on CVBG's or convoys should not
assume a uniform spread across all ships in the formation. Great
efforts are made by the attacker to ensure that the high value
units are hit first.
z. Timely and routine updating of data bases is essential,
once the first ones are more thoroughly scrubbed. Names of
ships and squadrons are less important than good numbers/
locations. Adding programmed Blue forces and projected Red/Green
forces for 1995 should come as soon as possible. The current
plan for a 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995 data base is supported with
additional years to follow.
8. NPS intends to address this lack of depth in naval warfare by
setting itself up as a center of naval strategic analytic excel-
lence using the RSAS as a tool. NPS will take the lead on
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setting up an in-government working group comprised of RSAS users
interested in naval force/modeling issues. Feedback will be
provided to all users, Rand, and the Steering Group. NPS also
intends to use the RSAS to measure the impact of the war at sea
upon the war ashore, and to demonstrate where the lack of naval
models makes other forms of combat analysis fatally flawed. The
Navy and NPS need a fully developed working model from Rand that
covers the broad spectrum of naval warfare involving all nations
around the world that have navies. Primary emphasis should first
involve strategic nuclear issues and the conduct of war in Europe
to include the flanks (since these models are the most
developed), and all other areas of the world should come later.
Navy and maritime models must be an integral part of the
strategic and European war models, not simply an adjunct.
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Part VI
SECONDARY LAND AND OTHER THEATER MODELS
1. Organization . Secondary Land Theaters, or S-Land is a
flexible model of land and air warfare in secondary theaters of
operation (outside of the central front in Europe). The model is
organized as a network with key theater locations as nodes, and
lines of communication (LOC) as arcs. In some cases, a point node
may not have any LOC arcs, such as on islands. The secondary
theaters represented in the PSAS thus far include Northern
Norway, the Baltic islands of Zealand and Bornholm, Greece, and
Turkey. There is also a modest model representing Southwest Asia.
A limited interaction with naval forces (generally scripted) is
available. S-Land depends upon the following three programs to
execute: analytic war plans (AWP's) in RAND-ABEL, a referee
model, also in RAND-ABEL, and a force adjudicator or "scripter"
written in "C." AWP's provide instructions to the model regarding
what each side is supposed to accomplish under various condi-
tions. Ground and air forces are assigned and deployed to
specific theaters and axes of operations. Naval air may be
assigned for use, and deep operations may also be ordered.
2. The S-Land War . A local ground commander module assesses the
situation as action progresses, and dispatches units according to
need. Each LOC and node have values and the composite theater
status is determined by the status of the most important LOC '
s
and nodes. Damaged targets are repaired at a fixed rate of five
per cent per day. Key and strategic events have been defined to
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assist in assessing the progress of the engagements. These
include the loss of a capital, the cut-off of forces along a LOC,
and the loss of key nodes. Bases are considered closed when the
level of damage exceeds 50%.
Combat adjudication is assessed by the referee, and results
passed to the S-Land force adjudication model. Combat results are
based upon results from previous studies extrapolated to fit the
area being simulated. Part of this process occurs in the referee
module and part in the force adjudication model, e.g. , if air
superiority has been gained by one side, this will have an affect
on the movement rate of the forward leading edge of troops
(FLOT). Seasonal modifiers built in to the modules affect FLOT
movement rates, air sorties and loss rates in specific areas
being simulated.
3. Graphics . The S-Land has a series of sophisticated graphics to
support it. A map can be called up which depicts the theater,
color coded to indicate friendly/enemy control. Windows can be
called up for various LOC's/nodes indicating their status. Unfor-
tunately forces assigned are currently not shown, a planned
future improvement
.
4. Deep Operations . The referee model assesses the results of
deep operations and the impact that the operations have on the
rest of the war. Deep operations currently include airdrop, air-
reinforce, heliborne, amphibious, sea-reinforce, unconventional
warfare, and chemical strikes. Several factors are assessed in
determining the outcome of these operations: air control,
surprise, defending forces. Missions include occupy or denial in
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most cases. Battle damage assessment is a function of mission
type and success. Types of targets include national capitals,
airfields, ports, stockpiles, key facilities, and LOC choke-
points. Each target is updated regarding degree of enemy/ friendly
control and the amount of damage sustained.
5. Improvements Needed . Future versions of S-Land should permit
representation of all seaborne and airborne forces contained in
the RSAS data base, permitting the analyst/player to change the
use of these unique forces as required rather than having to
preset them before the start of the war. Additional flexibility
is needed in the assessment of capabilities of airfields, e.g.,
when battle damage is sustained. Also, a compact method of
addressing all relevant S-Land parameters from a single location
is planned, so that the analyst need not enter different
processes to make changes. There is also no logistics represen-
tation in the current model. S-Land should include logistics at
least to the extent that it is in CAMPAIGN. Connections between
S-Land and the rest of the strategic portions of the RSAS need to
be improved so that RSAS events will have an impact upon the S-
Land. Perhaps the most important recommendation regarding S-land
is that it should not be developed to support testing truly
secondary land theaters (e.g. Korea) at the expense of strategic
nuclear and European theater needs (including the missing naval
components). The RSAS was originally conceived as a global,
macro-level model. Where S-land can be shown to be necessary to
represent accurately European flank campaigns, then priority
should be assigned there.
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Part VII
INSTALLATION AND USE OF RSAS AT THE NPS
1. Installation . The Sun installation at the NPS WARLAB consists
of two Sun 3/160 microworkstations with eight megabyte random
access memory (RAM) and two 71 megabyte hard disks each, a 575
megabyte hard disk, a 1/2" high density tape unit, and a laser
printer. Other units are on order to provide a networked system
with at least three monitors for research flexibility and Red/-
Blue/Control war gaming. The Sun installation is a shared ar-
rangement with the Operations Research (OR) Department WARLAB
providing the electronic and physical security as well as part of
the networked system. Arrangements are in progress to provide
hardware and software support for the Sun workstations and to
implement the local network capability. Additional details re-
garding the installation and planned enhancements are contained
in Appendix D.
2. Use of RSAS . It is anticipated that the RSAS will find mul-
tiple uses at NPS subject to the Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) contained in Appendix A, the security restrictions and
release procedures outlined in Appendix B, and the agreements for
mutual support in Appendix C. Potential users must understand
that mastering the RSAS is a process which should be expected to
take up to four man-weeks of concentrated training and up to six
months of full-time hands on experience.
a. The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department will pro-
vide a professor who is knowledgeable about the Sun microwork-
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station and the RSAS. This individual, the RSAS Administrator,
will control access to the RSAS part of the microworkstations in
accordance with the SOP guidance provided in Appendix A and on a
not-to-interfere with sponsored research basis. The RSAS Admin-
istrator will assign passwords, file space, give machine instruc-
tion, and will act as primary liaison with Rand Corporation and
the subcontractor, CACI , for all technical issues.
b. Primary RSAS use, naturally, is in support of sponsored
research performed by faculty members whose research accounts
have paid for the hardware and training of personnel. All other
use of the system is on a not-to-interfere basis. It is expected
that additional faculty and staff, including faculty from depart-
ments other than National Security Affairs, will be able to use
the RSAS as a teaching aid for courses and classes in general and
nuclear strategic planning, strategy, net assessment, threat
assessment, gaming and simulations, and intelligence. When the
RSAS is used to support instruction for any curriculum, the
faculty member responsible for the specific course/class will
first be given a copy of this report, a short orientation
briefing at the Sun raicroworkstation, and will be asked to
determine how RSAS use would best fit the needs of the course/
class. The RSAS Administrator will then perform whatever runs are
reguired (on a not-to-interfere basis) and the results will be
returned to the students in the form of a briefing/presentation,
to include charts and graphics. This would be followed by a
critigue, and further runs as desired by the faculty member. It
is not anticipated that any faculty/staff members, other than
those specified in sponsored research already involving the RSAS,
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will be trained to operate the system due, primarily, to the
lengthy training time required to master the system.
c. Student participation in the form of thesis projects
which will make use of the RSAS is especially encouraged. It is
not anticipated that any student will have the time to be trained
as an RSAS operator for seminar or other class papers. Students
who desire to use the RSAS for thesis research and their two
faculty advisors will first be given a copy of this report and a
short briefing/demonstration of the system. The faculty advisor
and student will be asked to explain to the RSAS Administrator
what use of the system they desire. The RSAS Administrator will
then perform whatever runs are required (on a not-to-interfere
basis), and the results would then be returned to the students in
the form of a briefing/presentation, to include charts and
graphics. This would be followed by a critique, and further runs
as desired by the student and advisor.
d. Other faculty may be able to use the RSAS for their own
research, again subject to standard restrictions, and on a not-
to-interfere basis with on-going research and use of the system
in support of instruction and thesis research. If adjudication
is necessary, the RSAS Principal Investigator will make any
necessary rulings.
e. Although the RSAS is available for student and faculty
research and instruction, and such use is encouraged, it must be
kept in mind that the information in the RSAS is SECRET/NOFORN/
WNINTEL/NO CONTRACT overall, and that these restrictions must be
carefully observed. Any reports which make use of the RSAS must
be submitted through proper channels for security review . The NSA
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Department, through the RSAS Administrator, will provide advice
and guidance regarding classification and release. Additional





Opportunities to support research at NPS are as follows: any
U.S. government sponsor can provide lists of topics that it
desires students or faculty to research in the future. The
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06) and the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) have already done this. Student
thesis topics are of the student's own choosing, as long as they
meet the necessary educational skill requirements, although
students are encouraged to select topics that their sponsors
desire. The obvious drawback is that NPS cannot "guarantee" that
a topic will be researched by students nor completed by a
particular date.
Individual research desires and the ability to obtain spon-
sorship from any DoN, DOD, or any other sources tends to
complicate the topics selected by the faculty for research. Each
civilian faculty member at NPS is normally hired for ten months.
The faculty member is expected to obtain sponsored research for
the remaining two months or take two months off without pay. The
faculty are naturally drawn into areas where a sponsor is willing
to provide resources. NSA faculty have been extremely interested
in the past to do Navy-relevant research but have not always been
able to find a Navy sponsor who has access to study money.
The lack of study money for OP-06 and a relatively modest
research budget within Naval Intelligence for research at NPS has
resulted in faculty being drawn to research areas that lie out-
side of those areas of normal interest to these two sponsors.
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When faculty research moves into one area or another, student
research in the form of theses generally follows. Put another
way, sponsored research generally results in additional student
research at no additional cost.
During FY-88, the Navy has set up a new direct funding pro-
gram for all Navy research. Under this scheme, Navy research
money is not allowed to be sent from a Navy sponsor directly to
NPS; these funds are provided directly to the school in the
budget. The National Security Affairs (NSA) department obtained
some of this block funding and has an FY-88 research program
already on-going. No Navy sponsor had to send additional money
to NPS under this scheme; instead money was provided by NPS to
the faculty member Principal Investigator if that faculty member
was able to locate a sponsor who agreed that the work ought be
done. For FY-88, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (0P-
603) agreed to sponsor RSAS work at NPS. Since there were more
faculty members at NPS who desired access to study money, NPS
could not fund all research proposed by the faculty. Generally,
those funded were those where the sponsor not only agreed that
the work needed to be done, but that the work also was of major
importance to the Navy.
Letters of Intent (LOI's) to perform Navy research under a
continuation of this direct funding program in FY-89 and beyond
are being prepared by faculty members at time of printing. These
LOI's must include a sponsor's name, rough budget page, and a
brief description of what work will be performed. Finding Navy
sponsors who want work done under the above conditions should be
relatively easy given the current budget climate. Identifying
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policy relevant projects to be done one year in advance is
extremely difficult. During the last cycle, most sponsors wanted
to change the terms of reference at the last minute and thus
marked the original proposals sent to them as no longer of
interest. Unfortunately, the net result of this was to cancel
some projects for one entire year, since NPS had not yet found a
mechanism to be administratively responsive to late breaking
changes in sponsor desires when a proposal had already been ruled
upon. Improved research administration procedures may change
this.
An NSA department objective for the future is to find add-
itional research sponsors who understand the unique opportunities
for RSAS and other related research at NPS. For example, if a
sponsor is interested in seeing NPS faculty perform research
using the RSAS, a general proposal for work should be crafted
with the understanding that upon execution (1 October 19XX) , the
sponsor will identify more specifically what is to be done during
the next year. This will require that all officials in the
sponsor ' s office understand why proposals are written the way
they are so that they are not rejected at the last minute for
being "vague."
Another vehicle to sponsor research at NPS is to transfer
funds from a non-DoN activity to NPS. A Military Interdepart-
mental Purchase Request (MIPR) can be used, for example, to
transfer money from DNA or OSD/NA to NPS. In such cases, DNA or
OSD/NA will act as the official sponsor. This vehicle is the
only way to sponsor additional research for FY-88 since all Navy
monies have been obligated and no new Navy money can be accepted
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by the NPS. This scheme might also be the one required for FY-
89 if the current direct funding system is terminated at the last
minute.
Potential sponsors should contact the RSAS Principal Inves-
tigator or the RSAS Administrator (the authors of this report) at
AVN 878-2521 or (408) 646-2521 to discuss opportunities further.
There has been some discussion of using the RSAS to support the
Strategic Think Tank (STT) being formed by the Navy to be located
at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The terms of reference
for the STT signed out by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on
24 November 1987 included supporting work to be performed by NPS.
Follow-through will have to include transfer of funds to NPS to
sponsor such efforts.
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Appendix A to RSAS Report
SOP FOR RSAS USE AT NPS
1. The RSAS is primarily a research and teaching tool designed
to analyze planning on the broad "strategic" level. It is not a
machine for evaluating specific weapons systems. The analyst must
be prepared to spend a considerable amount of time to set up war
plans and to learn enough about the system to be able to make
changes in the data base, and even the rules of the various force
structures. RAND estimates that mastering the system requires at
least four man-weeks of concentrated training, and up to six
months of full time hands-on experience. Naval Postgraduate
School experience validates this estimate.
2. The RSAS is located in the Wargaming Analysis and Research
Laboratory (WARLAB) in Ingersoll Hall. Physical security is under
the control of the security specialist assigned to the WARLAB.
Access to the RSAS itself is under the control of the RSAS Admin-
istrator, normally the senior RSAS analyst/lab technician assist-
ing the Principal Investigator in the National Security Affairs
(NSA) Department. Individuals desiring to use the RSAS for
research, studies, thesis preparation or classroom support will
initially discuss their proposal with the RSAS Administrator, and
will be given a copy of this report for study and a short orien-
tation briefing on the RSAS. The individual will then be
requested to determine how RSAS use would best fit the needs of
the project under investigation, and to advise the RSAS
Administrator of the type of data and/or runs required. The RSAS
Administrator will then ensure that the necessary runs are per-
formed, and will provide the results to the individual.
Conflicting priorities that cannot be resolved will be referred
to the RSAS Principal Investigator.
3. It is not anticipated that any faculty/staff members, other
than those specified in sponsored research already involving the
RSAS or hired directly to support the RSAS as a part of the NSA
Department laboratory package, will be trained to operate the
system, due to the time involved and the sensitivity of the
information in the RSAS.
4. In the case of those individuals who have been, or are to be
trained on the RSAS, the RSAS System Administrator will provide
system access, checkout, and briefings as needed. Individuals
reguiring access to the RSAS must contact the WARLAB security
specialist for the proper procedures to gain entry to the WARLAB
spaces.
5. A signup sheet will be maintained in the WARLAB for the Sun
workstations. A certain amount of flexibility should be main-
tained by all regarding use of the machines until the network of
three monitors is fully installed. The RSAS Administrator will
referee any problems concerning access to the RSAS, as needed,
and will be available for technical assistance as much as poss-
ible.
6. The RSAS is a SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL NO CONTRACT classified
operation, as covered in Appendix B for security and release.
Much of the information regarding intelligence and planning is
very sensitive, warranting even closer protection. Requests for
downgrading and declassification must be reviewed by the RSAS
Administrator prior to forwarding via the proper channels for
these purposes.
7. Individuals working on additional new research grants and
requiring RSAS support will be expected to contribute in accord-
ance with the following guidelines:
a. pay own salary and travel;
b. pay a prorated portion of the maintenance, supplies, and
other consumables;
c. pay for any upgrades that might be required for their
project; and
d. pay a prorated portion of the RSAS Administrator or
Laboratory Technician salaries, if a significant amount of their
time is involved.
8. Use of the RSAS is highly encouraged among the faculty and
students. The Department of Defense has expended a significant
amount of funding on this project, and it represents an elaborate
system which should be used to good advantage here at the Naval
Postgraduate School.

Appendix B to RSAS Report
SECURITY AND RELEASE PROCEDURES
1. The RSAS contains information extracted from the best avail-
able intelligence, and from sensitive U.S. planning procedures.
It is essential that certain restrictions be observed with res-
pect to protecting the classified material contained in the
various models and data bases that are part of the system. In
accordance with guidance determined by the RSAS Steering Group
and promulgated by the Director of Net Assessment, in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the RSAS runs at the SECRET NOFORN
WNINTEL NO CONTRACT level. Access is currently limited to U.S.
Government employees. Contractor access to the RSAS is limited to
RAND and one RAND-selected subcontractor. Consultants are not
exempt from these rules. Access will not be granted automatically
to any individual who has the appropriate clearance; need to know
must be established to the RSAS Principal Investigator's satis-
faction. Students, faculty, and staff of the NPS using the RSAS
for research or analytical support purposes in preparing studies,
papers, theses, etc., must classify the appropriate sections.
Studies that make use of the RSAS intended for open publication
must be submitted to the appropriate clearance release authori-
ties, and must be approved for release prior to unrestricted
distribution .
2. The NPS RSAS Administrator will provide advice and assistance
regarding any RSAS related material for which downgrading or
declassification authority is desired. An appropriate request
will then be made, as necessary, through the normal chain for
such matters.
3. The RSAS Administrator will maintain a list of individuals
authorized access to the RSAS, and will make the necessary
arrangements for access and passwords. The WARLAB provides
physical and electronic security for the RSAS. Arrangements will
also be made for an RSAS procedures guide and a use log. Individ-
uals making use of the RSAS will be instructed regarding security
constraints as outlined in this appendix, and in the use of the
procedures guide and the use log.
4. It must be kept in mind that the RSAS is a joint strategic net
assessment tool, and thus contains classified information that is
within the purview of all the services and intelligence agencies.
The sensitivity of the information within the system must be
observed.
Appendix C to RSAS Report
IPSA for Maintenance, Security, and Use
1. The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department, the Opera-
tions Research (OR) Department, the Director of Wargaming, and
the Wargaming Advisory Committee agree to the following pro-
cedures for the use, maintenance and security of the RSAS:
a. The recognized, prioritized list of operations which are
conducted in the Wargaming Analysis and ' Research Laboratory
(WARLAB) is as follows, in priority order:
(1) Classroom wargame laboratory sessions and preparation.
(2) Student and faculty research, to include resultant
thesis and report preparation.
(3) General classified word processing and computation
analysis (a recognized ancillary capability of the resident sys-
tems ) .
(4) Other DOD research and activities, to include resul-
tant report preparation.
b. The WARLAB Technical Director will manage the provision of
space on laboratory machines and floor space for peripherals to
support the operation of the RSAS as a recognized project under
category l.a.(2) above. Normal SECRET level physical and elec-
tronic security will be provided by the existing plant and secur-
ity procedures as currently published. Additional procedures for
the RSAS to meet the specialized requirements of SECRET NOFORN
WNINTEL NO CONTRACT, as directed for the system by the RSAS
Steering Group and the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA), will be observed through adminis-
trative arrangements between the WARLAB Technical Director and
the NSA RSAS Administrator. This will include visitor control and
physical access to the Sun workstation.
c. The NSA Department will provide a knowledgeable professor,
normally the senior RSAS analyst, who will be designated the RSAS
Administrator. The RSAS Administrator will be trained in RSAS
matters and in Sun system administration, will give advice and
assistance on RSAS security matters, will maintain administrative
access security to the RSAS by the use of passwords and the
normal UNIX security system, and will provide indoctrination and
control for RSAS users. The RSAS Administrator will be eligible
for and authorized access for certain SCI and compartmented
clearances in order to maintain a full comprehension of all RSAS
capabilities.
d. Primary access control to the space containing the Sun
workstation which hosts the RSAS will be through scheduling
dedicated time. At other times, when dual use of the space is
required, the Sun monitors will be screened from viewing by
others in the WARLAB while the RSAS is being operated.
e. Scheduled war games for classroom instructional support on
any system in the WARLAB will take precedence over any other
activity in the WARLAB. Whenever possible, RSAS analysts will be
permitted access to the Sun workstation when such access will not
interfere with the progress of a scheduled wargame. RSAS analysts
will be cleared for at least Secret, so their presence should not
hinder the progress of any regular lab war game. Any other prior-
ity conflicts will be handled by the Technical Director and the
RSAS Administrator, with adjudication by the RSAS Principal
Investigator and the Director of Wargaming, the OR Department




The Technical Director will administratively manage the
contract of the necessary Sun hardware and Sun software main-
tenance support. In the near term, the purchase of maintenance
services may be necessary while additional experience is gained
with the system. The primary concept for the future will be the
establishment of self insurance through the purchase of redundant
critical components to preclude costly maintenance services. The
NSA Department will provide reimbursement for a proportional
share of this cost, to be arranged by the Principal Investigator
and the Director of Wargaming. The NSA department will provide
all RSAS software support and unique RSAS hardware requirements.
g. Individuals working on additional/new research grants and
requiring RSAS support will be expected to contribute on a pro-
rated basis to RSAS costs. Additional details are as covered in
the RSAS standard operating procedures (SOP) contained in
Appendix A.
h. The NSA Department will make the RSAS available to the
WARLAB to be used in support of WARLAB war games, subject to the
coordination required through the RSAS Administrator and the
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Appendix D to RSAS Report
ENHANCEMENTS TO RSAS INSTALLATION AT THE
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
1. Current Installation . The WARLAB current inventory of Sun
workstations and related equipment consists of two Sun 3/160
workstations with eight megabytes of memory and two 71 megabyte
SCSI disks each, color monitors, a Fujitsu "Super Eagle" 565
megabyte hard disk, a 1/2" high density 6250 bpi tape drive, a
laser printer, and a Sun mounting rack. The Sun workstation
pedestals and monitors are part of the WARLAB, the remaining
equipment, including some of the memory augmentation, is part of
the RSAS project. The workstations are not networked together as
yet, but it is intended that this be accomplished in the near
future. The large disk and the 1/2" tape drive are to be moved to
the equipment room and installed in the newly arrived rack, using
cables on order. This move will reduce the noise level around the
workstation area.
2. Future Requirements . The current Sun workstation inventory is
adequate only for limited individual RSAS research and elemen-
tary scripted RSAS war games. To make full use of the RSAS
capabilities in the future, the NPS system will require a total
of three networked workstations which will permit multiple use
for analytic purposes and the ability to play two sided war games
(one monitor each for Red, Blue, and Control/Green). For proper
instruction, future development will require some type of large
screen display device in a secure classroom. Currently, display
of RSAS data is limited to a maximum of four individuals
"huddled" around, one individual workstation. Consideration must
also be given to the possibility that the Sun 3/160 on loan from
NOSC will eventually need to be replaced. The RSAS Principal
Investigator will look into using research and/or other resources
to obtain these improved capabilities. Plans for the new Build-
ing "A" being prepared by the Director of the WARLAB will include
full replacement for all RSAS hardware and a large screen display
in a secure classroom.
3. Workstations . The WARLAB has recently received the second Sun
3/160 workstation noted in paragraph one above. The new work-
station included the most recent Sun software release, which has
been installed on the station operating the RSAS. The two
stations will eventually be networked for a two-station system.
One additional diskless workstation will give NPS the three
station system required for gaming and for research flexibility.
In addition, the WARLAB has two large group displays, both about
7' by 4
'
, that could be used temporarily with the RSAS for pre-
sentations to larger groups, but these do not appear to be
adequate in the long term for instructional classroom purposes.
4. Maintenance Required . RSAS software maintenance will be pro-
vided by RAND under the Director of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA) development contracts
through at least FY-88. Subsequent arrangements are the respon-
sibility of the RSAS Principal Investigator. With regard to the
Sun workstations, it is intended that the basic maintenance will
be through redundant units, to lower the cost. In the initial
stages, however, and especially with certain single items, a
maintenance agreement with Sun Microsystems may be required.
There is currently no repair maintenance capability beyond what
has been learned during installation, i.e., NPS personnel can
remove and replace boards, and check basic DIP and backplane
settings. There are several alternatives, but the best seems to
be the telephone type maintenance, in which phone consultations
can be held with Sun, and parts pulled and returned for replace-
ment via mail. Since Sun is relatively handy (Santa Clara and
Milpitas), this arrangement should not present any insurmountable
problems, and is much cheaper than on-site support (about half
the price). Unfortunately, due to the presence of classified
information on the hard disks, the maintenance cost is higher
than normal. If Sun workstations proliferate at NPS, closer
support might be more cost effective in the future. Sun work-
station maintenance should remain a responsibility of the NPS
WARLAB, with appropriate fund support from the PI.
5. Sun Software Support . Software support for the Sun work-
station is also required. The most recent Sun release is 3.5,
which was included with the new workstation. The latest Rand RSAS
release, 3.0, has been installed on the Sun workstation. Sun
software support should be obtained to keep the Sun system
current, and to permit the use of all applications, including
those needed by the WARLAB, as well as the RSAS. If the Sun
workstations proliferate at NPS,' multiple licensing arrangements
should lower the cost.
6. Networking . Cables, attachments, and a transceiver box are on
order to connect the two present workstations and the various
devices together for the start of the network. For flexibility in
the WARLAB, a gateway to connect the Sun network with the DEC
network is required. A gateway is necessary to cut off the Sun
network, as needed, to meet security requirements. Gateway hard-
ware is currently available in the WARLAB, additional software
may be required.
7. Summary of Programmed/Recommended Additions . In summary, the
following hardware/software additions are recommended:
Priority:
Sun hardware maintenance for
Super Eagle hard disk * $ 400 ( apprx
per mo
4Mb Memory expansion board * $ 2,000
Sun 3/60-12 diskless workstation
w/graphics monitor * $ 11,300
Transceiver box for server
and client stations * $ 1,500
Cables and connectors * $ 2,000
Sun 3/180S-4 Data center server $ 12,600
8Mb Memory expansion board $ 3,400
Mid-term:
Shutdown power supply $ 5,000
Sun 3/60-12 diskless workstation $ 11,300
Long-term:
Sun 3 tempested remote workstation $ 30,000
Large screen display $ 30,000
Fiber optics cables $ 4,000
Color printer $ 10,000
Hardware/Software maintenance $ 10,000
* items currently on order.
8. Installation Summary . The current installation provides a
minimum capability to conduct research and to run elementary war
games on the RSAS. The addition of the equipment already on order
will enhance the present installation, provide for more flexible
use, and permit improved research and gaming. The purchase of the
mid and long-term equipment will provide excellent flexibility in
research for both students and faculty, will permit large-scale
briefings and group instruction, and will support the basis for
the operation of highly sophisticated war gaming.
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